Rational Animals? Developmental, comparative, philosophical and methodological perspectives.

A venerable philosophical tradition tracing its steps at least to Aristotle holds that rationality is what distinguishes humans from other animals. Roughly, the core idea is that only humans can understand why they do things they do and why believe the things they believe because they possess reflective abilities that other animals lack. This in turn appears to support the thesis that humans have a different kind of mind. Despite its enduring appeal, the tradition is in tension with Darwin’s insight that the mental faculties of human and non-human animals differ in degree rather than kind. It also faces the challenge of accommodating empirical research on, e.g., inferential reasoning in non-human animals, reasons-evaluation in young children and philosophical studies highlighting the unreflective bases of rational belief and action. The involvement of different disciplines illustrates the width and complexity of the debate. Among the theoretical and empirical open issues are the nature of rationality itself, the risk that advocates of opposing views might talk past each other, uncertainty about what counts as good evidence in favour of non-human rationality and how such evidence may be gathered. This conference aims to address some of these issues and to continue ARED’s work in promoting the dialogue between the philosophical and empirical study of the mind and rationality.



Kristin Andrews
York University, Toronto

Paul Harris
Harvard University

Amanda Seed
University of St Andrews

Eric Marcus
Auburn University

Mike Dacey
Bates Collage


Eva Rafetseder & Giacomo Melis
University of Stirling


Is there a feature that marks an anthropological borderline between human and nonhuman animals?

Date and Time

We are excited to announce that the conference will conclude with a public lecture by Professor Albert Newen from Ruhr University Bochum.

Abstract: In the last two decades we have witnessed the emergence of radically new insights concerning the cognitive abilities of animals. Considering some new insights especially in birds, fish, dogs and monkeys, I am discussing the recent candidates for an anthropological borderline between human and nonhuman animals. Looking at the best candidates, we find astonishing roots of relevant cognitive abilities in nonhuman animals. But why are we as humans so clearly dominant in inhabiting the world? There must be an essential difference but how can we best characterize it? The talk aims to offer an answer and invites the general public to contribute to the joint discussion of the central questions: how are we as human beings? Is there an anthropological borderline? How can we best understand the special role of our species?



Theme by the University of Stirling